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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL ON APPEAL IN
MISSOURI: A LIMITED INQUIRY INTO THE
FACTUAL AND THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
OF DOUGLAS v. CALIFORNIA*
JULES B. GERARDt
There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit
of counsel's examination into the record, research of the law, and
marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, already
burdened by a preliminary determination that his case is without
merit, is forced to shift for himself. The indigent, where the record is
unclear or the errors are hidden, has only the right to a meaningless
ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful appeal. Douglas v. Cali-
fornia.'
These words were the major premise for the Supreme Court's decision,
announced in March 1963, that the equal protection clause requires states
which permit appeals as a matter of right in criminal cases to furnish
lawyers for indigents wishing to appeal. The Court adduced no evidence
for its statement that an appeal without a lawyer is a "meaningless ritual."
Indeed, it refused to search the case before it for signs that the petitioners
had been prejudiced by an unclear record or hidden errors. This treatment
was strikingly different from that in Gideon v. Wainwright,2 decided the
same day, where the Court offered a series of practical considerations to
support its conclusion that a state must furnish trial attorneys to all persons
accused of "crime." It is, therefore, impossible to say at present whether
the major premise in Douglas is a categorial imperative, subject to debate
but not to investigation, or whether it is simply an assumption of fact sub-
ject to proof.
Research for this article was begun as an attempt to discover whether
the premise has any basis in fact. No one would argue that reversal per-
* The field research described in the text was made possible by a grant from Team-
sters Local 688, Labor-Management Charitable Foundation. The Foundation is not
responsible for any of the opinions expressed herein. The opinions are my own.
Steven Edelstein, Class of 1966, conducted the field research and prepared the Tables.
Professor Frank W. Miller's incisive criticism helped me organize my own thinking
and saved me some embarrassing blunders.
t Associate Professor of Law, Washington University.
1. 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963).
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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centages are the sole-or even a direct-measure of the value of lawyer
participation in the appellate process. But they give some indication of
that value, and they have the advantage of being available. After all, law
is not a science and courts are not laboratories. The variables constituting
the judicial process cannot on the one hand be eliminated or on the other
hand be controlled so as to produce results that are confined to the factor
whose influence is being tested. One of the reasons Missouri seemed ideal
for study is that all felony appeals go directly to the supreme court.' It
was thought this would obviate the need to correlate data from different
courts. However, the Missouri Supreme Court hears felony appeals in two
divisions, and, occasionally, en banc. As will be seen later, there may be
significant differences between the three sets of appeals.
Missouri seemed peculiarly appropriate for testing the Supreme Court's
ipse dixit for a more important reason also. By placing its decision squarely
on the equal protection clause, the majority in Douglas made lawyer par-
ticipation the constitutionally crucial feature. Dissenting Justice Harlan
argued that the basic problem was one of due process, and that the crucial
factor should be whether the indigent was offered a fair method of protect-
ing his substantial rights, with or without a lawyer. When Douglas was
decided, there were three ways of appealing a felony conviction in Mis-
souri. They varied in the extent of lawyer participation from perfunctory
to complete. A study contrasting the results in the three types of appeals
for a given time period would, it was thought, offer some insight into the
value of lawyer participation in the appellate process. After Douglas, the
Missouri Supreme Court amended its rules to require trial courts to ap-
point lawyers for indigent defendants wishing to appeal.4 A study con-
trasting the results of appeals after the rule change with those before should
then reveal whether formal compliance with Douglas had worked any
noteworthy changes. A period of two years was chosen as a span that
would yield a manageable but statistically significant number of cases. This
article is the study of the first period, March 1, 1962, till the effective date
of the new rule, March 1, 1964. I expect to make the follow-up study
next year.
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A. Research Method
Information was obtained from two sources. Official supreme court
records of all cases decided during the two years ending March 1, 1964
were studied.5 Then questionnaires were sent to all lawyers listed as attor-
3. Mo. CONST. art. 5, § 3.
4. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 29.01 as printed in 19 J. Mo. B. 439-40 (1963).
5. A data sheet was compiled on each case; a sample will be found in Appendix A.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1965/iss4/3
RIGHT TO COUNSEL ON APPEAL
neys of record in the official files.' From the questionnaires came such data
as whether the attorney was retained or appointed, the stage at which he
had entered the case, etc.
The court decided 163 cases during the period. Five were proceedings
under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 27.26, which provides that
A prisoner in custody under sentence and claiming a right to be
released on the ground that such sentence was imposed in violation
of the Constitution... or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may
file a motion at any time .... '
These five cases are ignored because they were collateral attacks rather
than appeals.' The core of this study, then, consists of 158 routine appeals.
Supplemental information about 115, or 73 per cent, of them was obtained
from questionnaires returned by lawyers.9
B. Pre-Douglas Missouri Procedure
At the time Douglas was decided, there were three ways of appealing
a felony conviction. The most perfunctory, in terms of lawyer involvement,
was to appeal on the motion for new trial. A lawyer, almost always the trial
attorney, prepared the motion. A defendant wishing to appeal without a
lawyer then had only to file a notice of appeal in the trial court. The trial
court prepared a transcript, and the transcript and motion for new trial
constituted the record on appeal. The Missouri Supreme Court reviewed
against the transcript all assignments of error properly preserved in the
motion, and could also consider plain errors not raised.1" Table 1, which
breaks down the cases by method of appeal and division of the court, dis-
closes that more than half (81 of 158) took this form.
The second method was to appeal on a brief without oral argument.
Only points preserved in the motion for new trial could be argued in the
brief." However, when a brief was filed the supreme court considered
6. A sample is set out in Appendix B.
7. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 27.26.
8. In Missouri a collateral attack under Rule 27.26 is in the nature of a habeas corpus
proceeding. It is intended to provide a more convenient and expeditious remedy than
habeas corpus. State v. Thompson, 324 S.W.2d 133, 135 (Mo. 1959).
9. Supplemental information about 155 cases was sought. Questionnaires concerning
115 cases were answered, which is a response of 76%.
10. See State v. Bosler, 366 S.W.2d 369, 372 (Mo. 1963). Subsequent cases state
that the supreme court will review all assignments of error properly preserved in the
motion for a new trial, but, by their lack of comment upon the subject, cast doubt upon
the proposition that the court will consider plain errors not raised in the motion for a new
trial. See, e.g., State v. Price, 362 S.W.2d 608, 611 (Mo. 1962).
11. Cf. State v. Tucker, 362 S.W.2d 509 (Mo. 1962).
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TABLS 11
METHOD OF APPEAL
Brief Full
MNT Only Argument Total
Division 1
Total cases 41 15 222 78
Retained att'y 10 7 12 29
Pro se - 4 2 6
Other att'y 12 2 5 19
No data 19 2 3 24
Division 2
Total cases 39 132 18 70
Retained att'y 13 6 11 30
Pro se - 2 - 2
Other att'y 8 1 4 13
No data 18 4 3 25
En banc
Total cases 1 1 8 10
Retained att'y 1 1 2 4
Pro se - - - 0
Other att'y - - 3 3
No data - - 3 3
Total
No. cases 81 29 48 158
Retained att'y 24 14 25 63
Pro se 0 6 2 8
Other att'y 20 3 12 35
No data 37 6 9 52
1. Excludes five cases filed under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 27.26. This provision
permits a collateral attack upon the conviction under certain limited circumstances. See
the text for further discussion.
2. Includes one case in which the state was the appellant. There were two such cases
altogether.
only those points properly raised (i.e., it did not consider plain errors not
raised)," and confined its attention to those parts of the transcript ap-
pended to it.13 There were 29 such appeals, 18 per cent of the total.
Under a long-standing policy of the Attorney General, the state did not
present oral argument unless the defendant did. Whenever the defendant
was proceeding on a motion for new trial or on a brief without argument,
12. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 28.02.
13. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 28.08.
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the state's case was presented only by brief. In the former, the state briefed
all of the points raised in the motion. 4 Two deviations from this policy
occurred during the period. The Attorney General made an oral argument
in one case in which the state was the appellant, although the defendant
only filed a brief; the defendant argued once when the state merely briefed
the case. Both judgments were affirmed.
The third method of appeal was, of course, the traditional one with
a brief and oral argument. Table 1 reveals that slightly less than a third
(48 of 158) of the appeals were heard in this manner.
As a practical matter, the method available to indigents was the motion
for new trial. 5 This is not to say that indigent appeals always took this
form; Table 1 discloses that some appointed attorneys filed briefs for their
clients, and some others made oral argument. And nothing prevented the
defendant from filing his own brief and making his own oral argument, as
a few did. So far as lawyer involvement is concerned, however, the typical
indigent appeal was on a motion for new trial. The reason for this is that
appointed lawyers are paid neither fees nor expenses in Missouri."6
On the other hand, Missouri's indigent appellant was guaranteed at
least this much. Throughout the state, lawyers appointed to defend in-
digents at trial almost uniformly considered the preparation and filing of
the motion for new trial to be part of their original obligation." In only
two of the 158 appeals was there a possibility that the defendant himself
had had to prepare it. In essence, then, it can be said that, before the rule
change, the indigent's right to insist upon a lawyer's help was limited to
the motion for new trial appeal. The effect of the change is an open ques-
tion. It was discovered during the investigation for this article that such
appeals are still reaching the court. This indicates that some judges inter-
pret the amendment to mean only that they have to appoint lawyers in
those rare instances in which the trial attorney fails or refuses to file a
motion for new trial, and that the appointed attorney retains the same
choice of methods of appeal previously available. Other judges and lawyers
interpret the change to mean that the lawyer appointed for an appeal now
must file a brief and present oral argument.
Missouri's motion for new trial appeal differs from the procedure de-
clared unconstitutional in Douglas in two respects: (1) the court decides
14. Interview with a member of the Criminal Division, Office of Attorney General of
Missouri.
15. See Gerard, A Preliminary Report on the Defense of Indigents in Missouri, 1964
WAsH. U.L.Q. 271, 314.
16. MO. SUP. CT. R. 29.01.
17. Gerard, supra note 15, at 314.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the case on its merits instead of simply deciding whether it warrants the
appointment of an attorney; and (2) the lawyer has in fact helped the
court find alleged errors by preparing the motion for new trial. The latter
point probably is insignificant, however, because the time requirements in
Missouri are such that the lawyer normally must prepare the motion before
the transcript becomes available to him, and before he has had time to
research the law beyond that done in preparation for the trial."8 Because
he is required to rely upon his memory, and has little time for research, the
lawyer preparing the motion tends to blanket everything that could con-
ceivably amount to error. Hence, in the terms of Douglas, there is no ex-
amination into the record and no research of the law. Obviously there is
no marshalling of arguments in such a motion.
Table 1 points up a fact which needs emphasis, namely, that indigents
were not the only defendants whose appeals did not involve full participa-
tion of lawyers. Attorneys were retained in 24, or approximately 30 per cent,
of the 81 cases heard on motions for new trial. If the 37 cases about which
no data was available are eliminated, 55 per cent (24 of 44) of the cases
heard in this way were filed by retained attorneys. By the same token, nearly
half (14 of 29) of the cases appealed on briefs without oral argument were
filed by retained attorneys; eliminating the no data cases raises the figure
to 61 per cent. Overall, if the 52 no data cases are eliminated, retained
lawyers were willing to have appeals heard on less than full argument 36 per
cent (38 of 106) of the time.
One possible explanation for this has a direct bearing on this study,
namely, that some non-indigents were unable, with what they could afford
to pay, to find lawyers willing to do more than file motions for new trial. If
the majority in Douglas was correct in concluding that the problem is sim-
ply one of equal protection-of providing the indigent with the same
lawyer-services a non-wealthy but non-indigent defendant could buy-then
it is arguable that Missouri's pre-Douglas procedure was constitutional
except in those rare instances in which defendants themselves had to pre-
pare motions for new trial. It would also be arguable that an interpreta-
tion of the new rule as only formalizing what previously had been the
virtually uniform practice would be constitutional, even if it could be dem-
onstrated to a certainty (which it cannot) that an appeal on the motion
for new trial is "a meaningless ritual."
18. A motion for a new trial should be filed ten days after the verdict. Upon appli-
cation by the defendant the court may extend the time to thirty days. The court has no
power to make a further extension. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 27.20.
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C. Lawyers' Opinions about the Pre-Douglas Procedure
Another possible explanation, of course, is that a significant number of
lawyers believed that their clients were adequately protected without a
traditional appeal. Many Missouri attorneys believe the defendant is better
off appealing on the motion for new trial than he would be having an ap-
pointed lawyer brief and argue his case. Their contention is that because
the Attorney General briefs, and the court considers, every point raised in
the motion, it is possible to assert many more grounds for reversal than
would be permitted if the defendant's attorney were confined to a brief.
Questionnaires were sent to all lawyers listed as attorneys of record in
the official files of the court, in some instances to two lawyers about the
same case. 9 Altogether, questionnaires went to 132 lawyers, 98 of whom
answered, a response rate of 74 per cent. Twenty-four of the 132 had rep-
resented more than one defendant during the period, and 17 of them re-
sponded."u All were asked, "Some lawyers say that the old rules were more
beneficial to the defendant than the new rules-that is, that the defendant
had a better chance of securing a reversal under the old rules than under the
new. Do you agree or disagree?" The results are shown in Table 2. Nine,
or slightly more than half, of the 17 who represented two or more defen-
dants agreed. But 42 of the 81 who represented only one defendant, also
slightly more than half, disagreed. Taking the two groups together, one
third (33) of the 98 responding agreed while one half (48) disagreed.
The lawyers were invited to comment about their answers, and many
of them did so. Two arguments, in addition to that already set out, ap-
peared frequently in questionnaires from agreeing lawyers. One was that
judges of the Missouri Supreme Court were likely to be more familiar with
criminal law than an appointed lawyer. A second was that the court could
do a better job than an attorney working without fees or expenses. A num-
ber said that an attorney required to undertake the additional burden of
an appeal on top of a trial literally could not afford to prepare adequately.
Those who disagreed said such things as the court gives more attention
to the case if the defendant is represented, and it is "an illusion" to believe
that the court really searches the record for errors. One noted ironically,
"I would hate to think that a lawyer by filing a brief and arguing before
the Supreme Court wouldn't be performing a service for his client."'" An-
19. In one instance questionnaires were sent to three attorneys about the same case.
Two attorneys were sent questionnaires concerning the same case in fourteen instances.
20. Of the seventeen attorneys who answered, fifteen handled two cases. The other
two handled four and six cases.
21. This attorney, as well as others whose answers have been summarized, apparently
assumed that the new rule requires a brief and oral argument by counsel. I made the
same assumption when I drafted the questionnaire.
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TABLE 2
LAWYERS' RESPONSES TO QUESTION: DO YOU AGREE THAT OLD
PROCEDURE WAS MORE FAVORABLE TO DEFENDANT THAN NEW?
Don't No
Agree Disagree Know Answer Total
Attorneys who, during
period studied,
represented:
One defendant 24 42 11 4 81
More than one
defendant 91 6 1 1 17
Total 33 48 12 5 98
1. Includes one attorney who said the change would make no difference.
other said, "The latter position presupposes that a court appointed lawyer
on an appeal would slop through the case because he is not paid. I would
not behave in such a manner, and I do not think other lawyers would either
(at least not the great majority)." Perhaps the best statement of this
attitude was put in these words:
It would be difficult to convince me that the lack of a lawyer would
be beneficial to a defendant on appeal. Even though the Supreme
Court may have been diligent in its review of the transcript, there is
no substitute for a brief and argument which points out to the Court
specific instances of error in the record and underscores these instances
with argument and authority.
The purview of the Court is one of passing on questions presented and
it is not its responsibility to search out error in the record. To require
the Court to do so places a burden upon it which is not logically or
historically its own. The Court should not be required to act as an
advocate as well as an arbiter.
The defendant has a far greater chance under the recent rules
change. I believe this is a return by the Court to its rightful place in
the administration of justice.
Two points were made by attorneys on both sides of the question. The
first was, in the words of one attorney, "The prime new advantage is rea-
sonable assurance of oral argument-whatever that's worth." The other
was that the efficacy of the new rule may depend upon whether the lawyer
appointed for the appeal is the same one who appeared at the trial. A
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1965/iss4/3
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TABLE 31
CASES BY ATTORNEYS WHO PREPARED APPEALS
Division Division
1 2 En bane Total
Motion for new trial by
Trial att'y 27 23 1 51
Appeal att'y 32 3 - 6
Pro se - - - 0
No data 11 13 - 24
Brief by
Trial att'y 10 113 1 22
Appeal att'y I - - 1
Pro se 4 2 - 6
No data - - - 0
Full argument by
Trial att'y 19' 15 6 40
Appeal att'y - 3 2 5
Pro se 2 - - 2
No data 1 - - I
Total
Trial att'y 56 49 8 113
Appeal att'y 4 6 2 12
Pro se 6 2 - 8
No data 12 13 - 25
I. Excludes attacks under Rule 27.26.
2. Includes one case in which trial attorney died prior to appeal.
3. Includes one case in which state appealed and made oral argument. Defendant
simply filed a brief.
4. Includes (a) one case in which an attorney who had not appeared at the trial was
listed on the brief with the trial attorney, and (b) one case in which the state appealed
from a quashing of the information.
number of lawyers argued that a defendant would be better off proceeding
under a motion for new trial prepared by the lawyer who conducted his
defense than with oral argument made by an appointed attorney who had
not participated in the trial. Table 3 shows what happened during this
period. Trial attorneys prepared 72 per cent of the appeals; if the 25 no data
and 8 pro se cases are eliminated, the proportion rises to 90 per cent (113 of
125). In only 9 per cent (12 of 133) of the cases were appeals prepared by
different attorneys.
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D. Problem Areas
1. Identifying Indigents
Table 1 shows that 63, or 40 per cent, of the 158 appeals were filed by
"retained attorneys." This proportion increases to 59 per cent (63 of 106) if
the no data cases are eliminated. There are a number of reasons why this
designation should not be equated to "non-indigent." First, it does not mean
the lawyers were paid; three lawyers who returned questionnaires noted
that they were never paid even though they had been "retained." Second,
inclusion of his case in this category does not indicate the defendant had a
retained attorney at his trial. Two lawyers stated that they were listed as
attorneys of record as a matter of courtesy only; that they had been ap-
pointed to represent the defendants at their trials, and that the defendants
had then "found some money" to retain different lawyers for the appeals.
Third, two cases are included in this category in which attorneys were
hired for trials only, and took appeals without fee because they thought
them meritorious. Fourth, all cases in which lawyers were retained are
included without regard to who did the retaining; two were retained by
families of the defendants, one by the defendant's employer. In summary,
this category includes all cases in which a lawyer was retained (a) either at
the trial or for the appeal, (b) whether or not he was paid, and (c) irre-
spective of who retained or paid him. The weakness of classifying all such
cases "non-indigent" is obvious.
However, it is unnecessary to identify those cases involving indigents.
The question is whether the method of appeal to which the indigent had
a right was less effective than the methods available to defendants able to
pay fees. Since, during the period under investigation, the indigent,
practically speaking, had a right only to an appeal on motion for new trial,
the issue is whether this method was less effective than the others. For pur-
poses of comparing the effectiveness of methods, indigency of the defen-
dants is irrelevant.
2. Pro se Appeals
A more difficult problem is presented by the eight pro se appeals. Two
of these were presented on full argument, six by briefs without argument.
Beyond that, little crucial information is available.
Of the six appeals presented on briefs, it is thought that one defendant
himself prepared both the motion for new trial and the brief. In another,
the defendant wrote his own brief, but it was impossible to determine who
prepared the motion for new trial. It was also impossible to determine
whether the defendants in these two cases were lawyers. Lawyers did
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1965/iss4/3
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prepare motions for new trial in the other four instances, while the de-
fendants prepared their own briefs. One of these defendants was a lawyer.
In the two cases presented on full argument, it is known that attorneys
represented the defendants at their trials and prepared the motions for
new trial. The defendants proceeded beyond this point on their own, so
far as could be determined. One of them was a lawyer.
These cases could have been handled a number of ways. One possibility
was to eliminate from consideration the two in which the extent of the
non-defendant lawyers' participation was unknown, and to treat the re-
maining six as though they were appeals on motions for new trial, since the
non-defendant lawyers' participation terminated at that point. Another
possibility was to eliminate the six cases in which it could not be deter-
mined whether the defendants were lawyers, and to treat the remaining two
in the usual manner. Still another possibility, justified by the maxim that
"a lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client," was to eliminate
all eight from consideration, on the theory that they would be atypical
whether or not the defendants were lawyers. (The fact that all were af-
firmed may indicate this would have been the wiser choice.) It was finally
decided to put them in the categories in which they would have been in-
cluded had the defendants been represented on the appeals, and to permit
the reader to assess their significance.
3. Habitual Criminal Cases
One function of Missouri's Habitual Criminal Statute is to transfer the
duty of sentencing from the jury to the judge whenever the defendant has
previously been convicted of a felony. 2 In 5 of the 158 appeals, the
only error found was one concerning prior convictions. In four of them,
the proof of prior convictions was defective; in the other, the information
was defective in its allegation of prior convictions. None of these cases is
counted as an affirmance (except in Table 5, where the former four are
specifically identified). Yet no errors were found in any of the trials. In
the four cases of inadequate proof, new trials will be unnecessary if the
state can properly prove the prior convictions. Hence, it is arguable that
these cases should not be considered reversals. But it did not seem satis-
factory to eliminate them or to consider them affirmances either.
22. Mo. REv. STAT. § 556.280 (1959).
Prior to 1959, § 556.280 included a subsection which imposed a harsher sentence upon
habitual criminals. Since 1959 the sole function of the habitual criminal act has been to
transfer the function of determining sentence from the jury to the judge.
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4. En banc Cases
En banc decisions are atypical also. The ten decided during this period
represents less than 8 per cent of the court's criminal business. All appeals
from sentenecs of capital punishment go to the court en banc automati-
cally. 3 In addition, cases can be transferred to the full court when there has
been a dissent in the division to which it was assigned, and at other times on
the court's own motion.24 Five of the ten en banc decisions were capital
cases. One of the remaining five appeals was transferred to the court en
banc because a federal constitutional question was involved. Why the other
four were decided en banc is not known. The judgment in one was affirmed
without dissent in Division 2, and then again affirmed by the court en
,banc. Two others were first assigned to divisions, and then transferred to
the full court before decisions were rendered. The earlier history of the
remaining case was not available.
Since there were so few en banc decisions, and half of them were capital
cases, it is doubtful that they afford a separate basis for conclusions. It
might be mentioned parenthetically, however, that two of the five capital
cases were presented on less than full argument. In both, the defendants
were represented by retained attorneys upon appeals from convictions for
murder. Both were affirmed. The three capital cases heard on full argu-
ment were all presented by appointed attorneys working without compen-
sation. Two were convictions for forcible rape, and one was reversed. The
other was a conviction for murder, and it was reversed.
5. Cutoff Dates
Another variable was introduced into this study by the cutoff dates. The
use of such dates was dictated by the impossibility of determining for every
appeal whether the trial judge was, or thought he was, functioning under
the new rule or the old one, and whether he thought the new rule required
anything more than the previous practice. There is no doubt that a few of
the cases considered here should be included in the forthcoming study.
This is because some lawyers and some judges read Douglas to require that
indigents be given a full argument, and began acting accordingly, either
as soon as the decision became known, one full year before the effective
date of Missouri's new rule, or at the time the new rule was announced in
October 1963,25 six months before its effective date. On the other hand,
23. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 28.19.
24. Mo. CONST. art. 5, § 9.
25. See 19 J. Mo. B. 439-40 (1963).
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some appeals begun under the old rule undoubtedly will have been decided
after March 1, 1964, and properly belong in this study although they will
be picked up in the later one.
II. THE CASES
In its simplest form, Douglas stands for the proposition that the difference
between a meaningful appeal and a meaningless ritual is the presence of a
lawyer. Stated in this way, the proposition cannot be tested by the Missouri
cases, because in only one, or perhaps two, appeals was the defendant
entirely without an attorney's aid. The Supreme Court, however, assumed
that certain benefits flow automatically from the presence of counsel, viz.,
examination of the record, research of the law, and marshalling of argu-
ments. Douglas' proposition can be tested by the Missouri cases if one dis-
regards the Court's statements and focuses instead upon the assumed bene-
fits. That is, the proposition can be tested if it is put in this form: the
difference between a meaningless ritual and a meaningful appeal is a
counsel's examination of the record, research of the law, and marshalling of
arguments. If this is the proposition to be tested, the motion for new trial
appeals may be treated as though the assistance of counsel were entirely
absent, for, as has been pointed out, such appeals almost always lack the first,
have very little of the second, and never have any of the third.
If the Supreme Court was correct, one would expect to find significant
differences in results between, on the one hand, motion for new trial appeals,
and, on the other hand, the other two kinds of appeal considered together.
For it could be contended in both the latter that the lawyers had performed
all of the tasks required by Douglas: they had examined the records, re-
searched the law, and marshalled the arguments. By the same token, one
would expect that there would be no significant differences in results be-
tween appeals heard on briefs only and those presented on full argument,
for the only variation between these two is oral argument, a feature not
mentioned in Douglas.
What, then, do the cases show?
Delay is one form of prejudice in criminal cases. A person unable to
post bond may have to remain in jail awaiting decision of his appeal.
Table 4 reveals no significant differences between methods of appeal with
respect to the length of time between the entry of the trial judgment and
the decision on appeal.
Table 5 breaks down the appeals in terms of gross results. One hundred
eighteen, approximately 76 per cent, were affirmed without qualification.
Table 6 establishes the proportions of these affirmances to total cases de-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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TABLE 4
ELAPSED TIME (MONTHS) BETWEEN TRIAL JUDGMENT AND DECISION
ON APPEAL
Brief Full
MNT Only Argument
(Number of cases studied) (81) (29) (48)
Minimum 5 8 3
Maximum 26 16 26
Median 12 12 12
TABLE 51
OUTCOME OF APPEAL BY DIVISION
Division Division
1 2 En bane Total
Affirmed 61 52 5 118
Aff'd in part,
rev'd in part 1 1 2
Aff'd except as
to sentence 2 2 4
Reversed 3 1 4
Rev'd and
remanded 10 13 5 28
Total 77 69 10 156
1. Excludes (a) two cases in which state appealed, and (b) five attacks under Rule
27.26.
cided, both by method of appeal and by division of the court. In Division 1,
there was a difference between motion for new trial and brief only appeals.
But there was no significant difference between the former and full argu-
ment appeals. Indeed, the affirmance rate was higher in the latter than
in either of the first two categories. In Division 2, the difference in affirm-
ance rates between cases heard on motions for new trial and those heard
on briefs was insignificant. But the difference between these two categories
and full argument appeals was a remarkable 33 points, dropping from
83 per cent to 50 per cent. In overall results, the significant difference was
not between the first category and the others, but between the last category
and the first two; the affirmance rate was 16 points lower than briefs only,
and 21 points lower than motions for new trial.
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TABLE 61
COMPARISON OF AFFIRMANCES BY METHOD OF APPEAL
Division Division
1 2 En banc Total
Motion for new trial
No. cases 41 39 1 81
No. affirmed 33 33 1 67
(80%) (85%) (100%) (83%)
Brief only
No. cases 152 123 1 28
No. affirmed 11 10 1 22
(73%) (83%) (100%) (79%)
Full argument
No. cases 214 18 8 47
No. affirmed 17 9 3 29
(81%) (50%) (37%) (62%)
Total
No. cases 77 69 10 156
No. affirmed 61 52 5 118
% affirmed (79%) (75%) (50%) (76%)
1. This table excludes (a) two cases in which the state was the appellant, and (b)
five attacks under Rule 27.26.
2. Includes four cases in which defendants appeared pro se.
3. Includes two cases in which defendants appeared pro se.
4. Includes two cases in which defendants appeared pro se.
Affirmance rates were then plotted as a function of the type (i.e., re-
tained or not) of attorney. The difficulty of defining "retained" has al-
ready been discussed. Briefly, a retained attorney was any lawyer who said
he was retained, whether or not he was paid, and irrespective of who paid
or retained him. An "other attorney" was any lawyer, except the defen-
dant, who was not "retained" as thus defined.
The results are given in Table 7. The affirmance rate for retained law-
yers was approximately 15 points lower in both divisions and overall
than the affirmance rate for other attorneys in cases heard on motions for
new trial. Ignoring the brief only appeals because the number of cases
(three) involving other attorneys is so small, the figures in the last category
are the most striking. Excluding the two capital cases in which convic-
tions were reversed by the court en banc, "other attorneys" were uniformly
unsuccessful in appeals presented on full argument. Their affirmance rate
of 100 per cent compares to 64 per cent (7 of 11) in Division 1, and an
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TABLE 71
AFFIRMANCES BY TYPE OF ATTORNEY
Division 1 Division 2 En bane Total
No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. %
cases affd cases aff'd cases aff'd cases aff'd aft'd
Motion for new trial
Retained att'y 10 6 13 11 1 1 24 18 75%
Other att'y 12 10 8 8 - - 20 18 90%
No data 19 17 18 14 - - 37 31 84%
Brief only
Retained att'y 7 4 5 5 1 1 13 10 77%
Other att'y 2 1 1 0 - - 3 1 33%
Pro se 4 4 2 2 - - 6 6 100%
No data 2 2 4 3 - - 6 5 83%
Full argument
Retained att'y 11 7 11 5 2 1 24 13 54%
Other att'y 5 5 4 4 3 1 12 10 83%
Pro se 2 2 - - - - 2 2 100%
No data 3 3 3 0 3 1 9 4 44%
Total cases 77 61 69 52 10 5 156 118
Retained att'y 28 17 29 21 4 3 61 41 67%
Other att'y 19 16 13 12 3 1 35 29 83%
Pro se 6 6 2 2 0 0 8 8 100%
No data 24 22 25 17 3 1 52 40 77%
1. Excludes (a) two cases in which state appealed, and (b) five attacks under Rule
27.26.
even lower 45 per cent (5 of 11) in Division 2, for retained lawyers.
Overall, retained counsel were successful 33 per cent (20 of 61) of the time
as compared to 17 per cent (6 of 35) for other attorneys. Considering only
appeals about which information was available, other attorneys were suc-
cessful only once in Division 2, in an appeal on a brief without argument.
CONCLUSIONS
Obviously, none of this data lends factual support to the underlying
assumptions of Douglas. First, the Supreme Court was wrong in assuming
that the mere presence of a lawyer is enough to secure an examination
of the record and a marshalling of arguments. The defendant appealing
on a motion for new trial gets neither. Since, however, this Missouri pro-
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cedure is unusual, it would be carping to criticize the Court for not being
familiar with it.
Second, the Court was wrong if it believed that the crucial factor is
an attorney examining the record and marshalling arguments on behalf
of the defendant. The defendant appealing on a brief without oral argu-
ment has both of these. And yet the difference in results between brief
only and motion for new trial appeals was much smaller than that between
brief only and full argument appeals, except in Division 1. Looking at
Division 1, the Court was wrong because there was no significant differ-
ence; looking at Division 2, or the overall results, the Court was wrong
because the significant variation occurred at a point where the factors
thought to be crucial by the Court remained constant.
Some things remain imponderables. Do the results depend upon the
method of appeal and the type of attorney, or do the merits of the case deter-
mine the method and whether an attorney can be retained to prosecute it?
Some of the data indicates the answer may be the latter: the proportion of
cases heard on less than full argument filed by retained attorneys; the fact
that seven attorneys said they preferred the old Missouri practice because it
let them dispose of frivolous appeals with a minimum of time, energy and
expense. If the requirements of Douglas are satisfied so long as this deci-
sion is made by the defendant's attorney, and so long as the attorney par-
ticipates in some kind of appeal, e.g., on the motion for new trial, then the
legal foundation for the decision, namely, the equal protection clause, will
not stand analysis. On the one hand, the appeals of some non-indigents
were heard on less than full arguments presumably because the fees were
not large enough to induce lawyers to spend a day traveling to Jefferson
City to make oral argument. And yet there were major variations between
the results of full argument appeals and the other two categories. "Major"
variations do not necessarily mean "constitutionally significant" varia-
tions, of course. But if the variations in results in Missouri were not con-
stitutionally significant, one wonders what evidence the Court had that
there would be greater variations between a lawyer and an appellate judge
searching a record for errors.
On the other hand, an interpretation of the equal protection clause
which requires that an indigent be given every conceivable service that a
wealthy person could buy in the same circumstances is also unsatisfactory.
A wealthy defendant can hire an experienced trial attorney, can afford to
pay that attorney for extensive investigations, wide-ranging discovery in the
form of depositions, and can also afford whatever expert witnesses are use-
ful. All of these things are desirable and I think they should be provided
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by the state to all defendants. But surely the equal protection clause is a
poor justification for them. For one thing, the definition of "indigent"
would have to be expanded to cover a vastly greater share of the popula-
tion than anyone has yet imagined. For another, the clause would have to
be a one-edged sword: if these services are provided free to anyone who
cannot afford them all, why should the person who can barely afford them
have to become a pauper in order to protect himself? Finally, in any com-
munity there are relatively few experienced trial lawyers who will under-
take criminal defense work. If the equal protection clause provides the
theory, then one of two things is inevitable: either the whole burden of
defending indigents will be imposed upon this small group, or the outcome
of appeals will be decided by such questions as whether the non-retained
trial attorney performed as well as another who could have been retained if
the fee had been large enough.
Significant differences in success rates between retained and other attor-
neys were noted. There are a number of possible explanations for this, and
nothing to indicate which is to be preferred. One possibility is that the
retained attorneys entered their cases much earlier (as, for instance, im-
mediately after arrest) than other attorneys. The Supreme Court has as-
sumed that this can make a crucial difference in the ultimate outcome of
cases, and there is no reason to believe it was wrong.20 Another possibility
is that retained attorneys are more likely to be experienced criminal law-
yers. There is some data that would partially support such a hypothesis.
Of the 24 attorneys of record who handled more than one case during the
survey period, 14 could be identified as criminal lawyers of reputation in
their communities, and most of them were retained for most of their cases.2
The other 10 lawyers were unknown to me. A third possibility is that if
the case is good enough, some lawyer can be found who will take it for
whatever the defendant can afford to pay.
The fourth possibility, one mentioned by many lawyers who returned
questionnaires, is the reverse of the third: only retained attorneys can af-
ford to devote the time and money necessary to be adequately prepared.
The data is ambiguous on this point. Contradicting it are the facts that
not all retained attorneys were paid and that two retained attorneys under-
took appeals without fees solely because they thought the cases meritorious.
26. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
27. Of the seventeen attorneys who answered questionnaires concerning forty cases,
five attorneys were not retained in six cases. This means that twelve attorneys were re-
tained in all of their cases numbering thirty. It also means that only one was appointed
to both of his cases. No information was available to determine whether the seven
attorneys who did not answer questionnaires were retained or not retained.
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Tending to confirm it is the fact that so many lawyers mentioned it. It
does not seem unreasonable to assume that a lawyer will not devote ade-
quate time to the preparation of an appeal if he has convinced himself,
rightly or wrongly, that he cannot afford to do so.
Suppose one were able to conclude, on the basis of this study, that the
difference in success rates between retained and other attorneys was con-
stitutionally significant, and that the cause of the difference was the non-
payment of appointed attorneys; what then? It seems to me the answer
must be that Missouri would be required to compensate appointed law-
yers. This follows, I submit, whether or not one agrees that the equal
protection clause was a proper foundation for Douglas.
It may be the Court was incorrect in assuming that certain benefits
would follow automatically if an attorney were somehow involved in the
appellate process. But this does not mean that the Court was wrong in
concluding that those benefits should follow; it only means the Court
couched the language requiring them in unfortunate terms. It may be the
Court was wrong in stressing examination of the record, research of the
law and marshalling of arguments. But it is equally possible that the Court
chose to emphasize those factors only because the pivotal issue in Douglas
was not the extent of lawyer participation, but whether a lawyer was to
participate at all. And it is conceivable that it chose to found its holding
on the equal protection clause simply as a device to avoid the charge that
it was meddling with state criminal procedure. If, for example, the Court
had held that the appeal is a "critical stage"28 of the criminal process, and
the due process clause therefore required the appointment of an attorney,
the question might have arisen whether states were required to permit ap-
peals in all criminal cases. The clear thrust of Douglas is that the indigent
criminal appellant must be given a fair method of raising substantial chal-
lenges to his conviction. Certainly one standard of fairness is what the
state provides for those who can afford to pay their own way. The Court
stopped short of this standard; it required that attorneys be appointed only
for the first appeal as of right, and not for any later or discretionary appeals.
That this is not logically equal protection does not detract from the fact that
it is practically due process.
If, as I believe, the correct interpretation of Douglas is that it is an amal-
gam of equal protection and due process designed to guarantee that an
indigent appellant will have an advocate to present his appeal in a method
at least roughly as effective as that permitted the non-indigent, serious ques-
tions are raised about the adequacy of the former Missouri practice, and,
28. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
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perhaps, of the new rule. As has been noted, this study cannot be taken
to prove that the result of an appeal often depends upon full argument be-
ing made by a retained attorney. But it does demonstrate that this is a
definite possibility. If so, the equal protection ingredient of Douglas may
require Missouri to compensate an appointed lawyer enough to make it
feasible for him to prepare a traditional appeal without unconscionable
sacrifice. Alternatively, it may require the creation of a state-wide public
defender, analogous to the Attorney General, who would handle all indigent
appeals. Such a system was recently instituted in Wisconsin."
At a minimum, I believe Douglas invalidates the motion for new trial
appeal, not because this method is demonstrably less effective than others,
but because (a) it does not guarantee the indigent the full use of his law-
yer's skills, and (b) because the method is largely invisible and therefore
subject to abuse. There are three arguments against this position. The first
is one already discussed: all Douglas requires is equal protection, and so
long as some retained attorneys employed this method, the indigent is en-
titled to no more. But an appeal is not adequate in all cases simply because
it is adequate in some. It is perfectly conceivable that some retained attor-
neys filing appeals on motions for new trial were convinced that the law
was so clear that all they needed to do was mention the error and the con-
viction would be reversed. Even the equal protection theory would not
sanction requiring the indigent to present a complex question in the same
manner.
The second contrary argument has also been mentioned: the indigent
is better off because the Attorney General briefs, and the court considers,
many more possible grounds for error. This contention is so obviously
specious that it hardly warrants comment. It assumes that a lawyer would
be so incompetent that he would fail to include in his brief a potential re-
versible error that he already had preserved in the motion for new trial.
One hopes that most Missouri lawyers are more capable than that.
The final argument is that abolishing this method of appeal would elim-
inate the most expeditious way of disposing of frivolous appeals. But if
the concern truly is about frivolous appeals, why is there no way of elim-
inating those filed by defendants with money? The real fear is not that
the number of frivolous appeals will increase, but that the amount of time
and money lawyers will be required to expend on indigent appeals, frivolous
or not, will increase intolerably. No one will slight that fear. But it may
be questioned whether the solution should be paid for with the indigent's
liberty rather than society's money.
29. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 957.265 (1965).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1965/iss4/3
RIGHT TO COUNSEL ON APPEAL
If the real thrust of Douglas is that the indigent must be provided with the
full range of a lawyer's skills at least once during an appeal, it is obvious
that the motion for new trial appeal does not meet the standard. Even if
this were not so, the method should be eliminated because it is largely in-
visible. How can one be sure that the real determinant of these appeals
is not the strength of the Attorney General's brief? The Anglo-American
legal system is founded on the theory that the best way of arriving at truth
is to have two advocates make the strongest possible arguments on opposite
sides of a question. Why, then, should it be complacently assumed that
judges of the Supreme Court of Missouri have a talent denied all other
judges, namely, that of conjuring up arguments in opposition to one side of
a question about which they are supposed to be impartial?
APPENDIX A
1. Style: ................................................................................................................................
2. N um ber: ..........................................................................................................................
3. Division: 1 2 en banc
4. Session: ............................................................................................................................
5. Court file num ber: ..........................................................................................................
6. Date trial judgm ent entered: ..........................................................................................
7. D ate appeal decided: ......................................................................................................
8. County where trial was held: ......... ......................
9. Results of trial:
Charge Verdict Sentence
Count I ................................ ................................ ................................
Count 2 ................................ ................................ ................................
Count 3 ................................ ................................ ................................
O ther counts ................................ ................................ ................................
(List in Remarks)
10. This was a (circle one):
a. Regular appeal.
b. 27.26 appeal.
11. Case for the state was presented by (circle one):
a. Brief without argument.
b. Brief plus argument.
12. Case for the defendant was presented by (circle one):
a. Motion for new trial without argument.
b. Brief without argument.
c. Brief plus argument by counsel.
13. If an attorney either argued or filed a brief for defendant, answer the following:
a. What was the attorney's name? ........................................................
b. Was the attorney (circle one):
(1) Appointed by the trial court?
(2) Appointed, or requested to appear, by Supreme Court?
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
(3) Retained by the defendant?
(4) A public defender?
(5) No data.
c. The attorney on appeal, if there was one, was (cricle one):
(1) The same as at the trial level.
(2) Different than at the trial level.
(3) No data.
14. If the state was the appellant, circle the number 14 and explain in Remarks.
15. (Circle all of the letters applicable. For example, suppose defendant was con-
victed on three counts of burglary, and suppose the Supreme Court affirmed his convic-
tion on the first count, reversed on the second count, and reversed and remanded for new
trial on the third, directing that some particular piece of evidence be excluded at the
next trial. In such a case, letters b, f and g should all be circled, and the details set out in
Remarks.)
As a result of this appeal, the judgement was (circle everything applicable):
a. Affirmed.
b. Affirmed on counts .................................... ; reversed on others.
c. Affirmed except as to degree of offense on counts ........................................
d. Affirmed except as to sentence, and sentence was (circle one):
(1) Modified by Supreme Court.
(2) Remanded to trial court for modification.
e. Reversed.
f. Reversed and remanded with directions.
g. Reversed and remanded for new trial.
h. O ther (give details) ..............................................................................................
16. Remarks. (If any of the above answers need elaboration or qualification, give the
necessary additional details here.)
APPBNrnx B
[The case was identified by style, docket number, and date, and the attorney was asked
to answer the following questions.]
1. Did you represent the defendant at his trial?
a. Yes
b. No
2. Did you prepare the motion for new trial?
a. Yes
b. No
3. If you represented the defendant at his trial, were you:
a. Appointed by the trial judge, without compensation.
b. Appointed by the trial judge, but arranged for a fee.
c. Retained by or on behalf of the defendant.
d. A public defender.
e. Other (explain in Remarks section).
4. On the appeal, were you:
a. Appointed by the trial judge to represent the defendant at his trial, and per-
formed your services on appeal as part of that appointment.
b. Appointed by the trial court specifically for this appeal.
c. Appointed by the Supreme Court specifically for this appeal.
d. Retained by or on behalf of the defendant.
e. A public defender.
f. Other (explain in Remarks section).
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5. Under the old rules, when a defendant was unrepresented on appeal, the Supreme
Court reviewed the transcript on the basis of the motion for new trial. Under the new
rules, lawyers must be appointed to represent defendants who wish to appeal. Some
lawyers say that the old rules were more beneficial to the defendant than the new rules
-that is, that the defendant had a better chance of securing a reversal under the old
rules than under the new. Do you:
a. Agree (If you wish to elaborate, please feel
b. Disagree free to do so in Remarks section.)
6. Remarks.
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